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"good" in its relation to the "real" and the "one" and its bearing on ethics. Dr. Arleth rightly points out that the practical and intelligible character of the Aristotelian ethics is largely delusive and that Aristotle everywhere builds on his peculiar metaphysical foundations. But he hardly raises the question whether this procedure is not more or less characteristic of every systematic thinker. For the rest, Dr. Arleth is a sound, competent and learned guide to the intricacies of Aristotelian thought, but for this very reason he does not arrive at any very startling novelties in his conclusions. The ἀνθρώπου ἀγαθόν he finds is determined by the εἶδος of man, his cosmic function, as it were. But he also recognizes that this conception dogmatically presupposes a knowledge of an immutable system of concepts, and has no answer to a questioner who doubts these assumptions.

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THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. By C. Lloyd Morgan, LL. D., F. R. S. London: The Macmillan Co., 1905.

This little book is an extension of an article which appeared in the *Contemporary Review* of May, 1905. It deals with the scientific and teleological aspects of the interpretation of nature, the aim of the book being, in the author's words, to show that a belief in purpose as the causal reality of which nature is an expression is not inconsistent with a full and whole-hearted acceptance of the explanations of naturalism within their appropriate sphere.

Commencing with a brief sketch of the development of the two modes of interpretation, Principal Morgan proceeds to expound and discuss the principles of naturalism. There is an admirably clear section dealing with the methods of physics, which employs simplified ideal constructions, instead of dealing with the complicated actual cases. What this means is made plain by some well-chosen illustrations from dynamics and astronomy. Equally clear is the discussion of the difference between the scientific and metaphysical uses of the words cause and effect, which in science might be replaced by the words antecedent and consequent.

The seventh section contains some considerations on the origin of life, and the question of the possibility of the interference of mind with matter. The author regards as fictitious the cogency

of an argument of which much has recently been made, viz.: that Vital Force is directive and can interfere with a material system without presenting any phenomena which contradict the laws of mechanics. According to naturalism the present configuration of the material system is determined only by its previous, and determines its future states. If, then, interference is possible, it makes an end of this basal law of dynamics.

Well, it seems that such a law will have to go, but not dynamics with it, and after all it is that which is the important thing to keep. From the problems of dynamics, human interference is expressly precluded, so that they are not to be affected by the decision of the question under discussion.

The examination of naturalism, the chain of antecedents and consequents, convinces the author that it is not inconsistent with his belief in purpose. The conclusion is put several times, somewhat hesitatingly, in the form of a question, the argument being that the inquiring human mind cannot rest satisfied with a record of antecedents and consequents, so that naturalism fails to satisfy. If man "feels justified in believing that, in the purpose which unifies, directs, and determines the course of his own experience, there is real causal agency, he cannot escape the conviction that it is in constant relation to a wider purpose, *of the same order of being*, but free from his own petty limitations and imperfections." Again, "Determinism, whether in external nature or in human life, is the expression of purpose; purpose is that which finds expression in determinate sequence."

We are not altogether satisfied with the amiable solution that both sides are right. We are not quite convinced that the rivals are looking at opposite sides of the same shield. Determinism may not be inconsistent with the wider purpose of which our author speaks, but it seems to render our human purposes illusory.

The book is enriched with extremely well selected examples, which serve to make clear and precise the author's meaning and to make the book intelligible and interesting to the general reader.

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AN ANALYSIS OF HUMAN MOTIVE. By F. Carrel. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co., Ltd., 1905. Pp. 222.

"Motives may be defined as volitional impulses determining the